Normativity

Being here at Pittsburgh, one gets the impression that the distinction between the normative and the descriptive--between a rule or law as something one is responsible to (in, say, employing a concept in a judgment) and as a description of a regularity in nature--is a conceptual advance that was made long ago and has been absorbed into the conciousness of working philosophers. I couldn't be more tired of hearing Bob Brandom remind us about how important this distinction is. And yet, I was looking at AskPhilosophers.org, and I found a question that cried out for the drawing of this distinction. In no less than three separate responses, the philosophers who replied failed to meet what I would consider a basic standard of adequacy for an answer to the question, which must surely mention the central role of normativity in our thinking about conceptual rules. Suddenly I am more sympathetic to Bob's constant refrain.

(Also, this question is absolutely hilarious, mostly because of the inclusion of the sentence , "Through sexual relations [sic]," but also because of the author's obvious insecurity about dating.)