Plato subscribed to Russell's Principle
SOCRATES: So it was only the poor man's dream of gold that we had when we thought we had got the truest account of knowledge. Or is it early days to be harsh? Perhaps this is not the way in which one is to define 'account'. We said that the man who defines knowledge as correct judgment together with an account would choose one of three meanings for 'account'. Perhaps the last is the one to define it by.
THEAETETUS: Yes, you're right to remind me; there is one possibility still left. The first was, a kind of vocal image of thought; the one we have just discussed was the way to the whole through the elements. Now what's your third suggestion?
SOCRATES: What the majority of people would say--namely, being able to to tell some mark by which the object you are asked about differs from all other things. (208c)
SOCRATES: ...Suppose I have formed a correct judgment about you; if I can grasp your account in addition, I know you, but if not, I am merely judging you.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And an account was to be a matter of expounding your differentness?
THEAETETUS: That is so.
SOCRATES: Then when I was merely judging, my thought failed to grasp any point of difference between you and the rest of mankind?
THEAETETUS: Apparently.
SOCRATES: What I had in mind, it seems, was some common characteristic--something that belongs no more to you than to anybody else.
THEAETETUS: Yes, that must be so.
SOCRATES: Then tell me, in Heavens name how, if that was so, did it come about that you were the object of my judgment and nobody else? (209a-b)
SOCRATES: Then correct judgment also must be concerned with the differentness of what it is about?
THEAETETUS: So it seems, anyway.
SOCRATES: Then what more might this 'adding an account to correct judgment' be? If, on the one hand, it means that we must make another judgment about the way in which a thing differs from the rest of things, we are being required to do something very absurd.
THEAETETUS: How's that?
SOCRATES: Because we already have a correct judgment about the way a thing differs from other things; and we are then directed to add a correct judgment about the way it differs from other things. (209d)
THEAETETUS: Yes, you're right to remind me; there is one possibility still left. The first was, a kind of vocal image of thought; the one we have just discussed was the way to the whole through the elements. Now what's your third suggestion?
SOCRATES: What the majority of people would say--namely, being able to to tell some mark by which the object you are asked about differs from all other things. (208c)
SOCRATES: ...Suppose I have formed a correct judgment about you; if I can grasp your account in addition, I know you, but if not, I am merely judging you.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And an account was to be a matter of expounding your differentness?
THEAETETUS: That is so.
SOCRATES: Then when I was merely judging, my thought failed to grasp any point of difference between you and the rest of mankind?
THEAETETUS: Apparently.
SOCRATES: What I had in mind, it seems, was some common characteristic--something that belongs no more to you than to anybody else.
THEAETETUS: Yes, that must be so.
SOCRATES: Then tell me, in Heavens name how, if that was so, did it come about that you were the object of my judgment and nobody else? (209a-b)
SOCRATES: Then correct judgment also must be concerned with the differentness of what it is about?
THEAETETUS: So it seems, anyway.
SOCRATES: Then what more might this 'adding an account to correct judgment' be? If, on the one hand, it means that we must make another judgment about the way in which a thing differs from the rest of things, we are being required to do something very absurd.
THEAETETUS: How's that?
SOCRATES: Because we already have a correct judgment about the way a thing differs from other things; and we are then directed to add a correct judgment about the way it differs from other things. (209d)
posted by gregates at 7:32 PM
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